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Abstract 
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given 
a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these 
dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the 
tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and 
an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real 
effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives 
encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, 
we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from quality to quantity 
to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform 
managers of appropriate ways to structure contracts, and suggest benefits to 
personalizing contracts based on individual behavioral characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms face a quantity-quality output tradeoff. For instance, a floor manager at an auto plant wants 
to incentivize her workers to put together as many engines as possible, but if workers are paid only 
based on the number of completed engines, they may be careless, and the engine may break down 
well before the warranty expires. Yet if the owner rewards workers solely based on the number of 
perfect engines assembled, there may be too few engines produced. Understanding how workers 
respond to the incentive schemes arising from such quantity-quality tradeoffs is essential for 
understanding the conditions under which different wage schemes are efficient. 
How to incentivize workers is a question fundamental to economics, and an active literature 
exists on the effect of different incentive compensation schemes on worker effort.1 Indeed, worker 
productivity and quantity of output have been focuses of theoretical and empirical economic 
research for decades (Laffont and Martimort, 2009; Syverson, 2011). Some important works also 
consider the quality side of the tradeoff. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) lay out 
seminal principal-agent models that incorporate the multi-dimensional aspects of worker 
incentives, and explain why incentivizing quantity may cause agents to ignore the quality of their 
output. Yet, we know little about how behavioral characteristics, such as loss aversion, affect how 
workers respond to different quality-quantity incentives. This paper addresses this issue with a 
laboratory experiment designed to parse out how agents with varying behavioral characteristics 
respond to quality-quantity incentives. 
                                                 
1 For instance, economists have used behavioral economics theories of gift exchange and framing to induce greater 
productivity of workers in a field setting – see Gneezy and List (2006) for gift exchange and Hossain and List (2012) 
on framing. Other notable papers include the merits of competitive or piece rate incentive schemes, including the 
gender gap in competitiveness (Gneezy et al., 2003), and various profit-sharing compensation schemes (Nalbantian 
and Schotter, 1997). While many of these papers have incorporated quality considerations into their work, none of 
them have evaluated quality of output directly.  
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In this paper, we examine the following questions: How do quality incentives impact 
productivity? Does incentivizing quality increase the quality of output? Does the quantity-quality 
tradeoff depend on the agent’s ability or behavioral factors, such as loss aversion? The theoretical 
model we outline provides insights into the answers to these questions, while the experiment we 
conduct provides empirical evidence. Specifically, our model of the quantity-quality tradeoff 
provides baseline predictions consistent with those found in the theoretical literature (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992), even though in our model quality is perfectly observable. In 
addition, the model highlights the idea that loss averse agents have a different quantity-quality 
tradeoff, especially when incentives to perform quality work are weak. To test this model,2 we 
conduct an experiment in which individuals solve math problems and their output quantity 
(number of answers submitted) and quality (number of problems answered correctly) is measured 
when (i) only quantity is incentivized, (ii) some quality is incentivized, and (iii) the bulk of the 
incentives are on quality. 
In the experiment, we find evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions. Our first 
result is that higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity 
to quality and to decrease the error rate (i.e., number incorrect/answers submitted) at the expense 
of lowering quantity of output. More importantly, we observe a behavioral component in 
responsiveness to the quality incentive. There is heterogeneity in the impact of treatment, with 
more loss-averse participants displaying greater changes to their output from a change in quality 
incentives. Overall, we find that loss aversion leads participants to focus more on quantity and less 
                                                 
2 In the spirit of forthrightness, we note that we designed the experiment to test whether any of the following behavioral 
characteristics affect the quantity-quality tradeoff: loss aversion, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and 
overconfidence. We were expecting that loss-aversion would play the major role, given the previous findings of Shupp 
et al. (2013). But it was not until we confirmed that loss aversion indeed affects the tradeoff more than other 
characteristics, that we formally incorporated loss aversion into our model. Therefore, our model is merely meant to 
guide the reader’s intuition around loss aversion rather than the other behavioral characteristics we tested. 
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on quality, but only when quality is weakly incentivized. In addition, we characterize participants 
by whether they focus on pursuing quality or quantity during the experiment, and find that higher 
quality incentives increase the number of participants whose primary focus is quality. 
This paper, therefore, contributes new insights to recent investigations of the optimal 
incentive contracts for workers in situations when the firm cares about multiple dimensions of 
worker output. A series of papers in economics have used existing data or field experiments to 
investigate the relative merits of flat rate versus piece rate incentive schemes in the workplace 
(Lazear, 2000; Paarsch and Shearer, 2000; Shearer, 2004; Copeland and Monnet, 2009; Helper et 
al., 2010; Ederer and Manso, 2013; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2015).3 The above papers find a positive 
impact of piece rates on quantity of output, but the evidence is mixed for its impact on quality.4 
For instance, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2015) find increases in quality, while Johnson et al. (2015) and 
Ederer and Manso (2013) find decreases in quality from pay-for performance compensation. There 
is also a new literature on incentives and creativity, documenting that financial incentives have a 
mixed effect on different dimensions of creative work, including quantity and quality 
(Kachelmeier et al., 2008; Charness and Grieco, 2014; Laske and Schröder, 2015; Erat and 
Gneezy, 2016). Some explanations for these results suggest that incentives may crowd out intrinsic 
motivation for performing certain tasks (Charness and Grieco, 2014; Erat and Gneezy, 2016), and 
that incentivizing quality may be difficult due to observability of quality (Kachelmeier et al., 2008; 
Al-Ubaydli et al., 2015). 
                                                 
3 Additional related work includes Eriksson et al. (2009) who use a real-effort experiment to examine how feedback 
about performance of others impacts quantity and quality under pay-for-performance and tournament payment 
schemes, and Bracha and Fershtman (2013) who study how competitive incentive schemes affect the combination of 
cognitive and labor efforts provided by workers. 
4 Helper et al. (2010) suggest that a piece rate may actually have a negative impact on quantity when the production 
process is complex and quality is unobservable. Similarly, Rubin and Sheremeta (2016) show that even in the gift-
exchange context uncertainty about quality can significantly decrease quantity. 
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An important question related to how to incentivize workers is whether incentives should 
be personalized to the worker. For instance, managers may wish to consider an individual’s ability 
or behavioral factors when determining what wage contract to offer. Attempts to take advantage 
of findings from behavioral economics in management and public policy have become popular in 
recent years (e.g., Camerer et al., 2003; Ho et al., 2006; Madrian, 2014). Related studies have 
explored the design of loss framed incentive contracts on workplace effort (Fryer et al., 2012; 
Hossain and List, 2012). These studies find that presenting incentives in the form of loss contracts 
(i.e., bonuses workers could potentially lose) increases productivity relative to payoff-equivalent 
gain contracts where the same bonuses are presented as gains. Recent related work also shows that 
loss averse workers actually prefer loss framed contracts (Imas et al., 2017) and that loss aversion 
plays a role in job search (DellaVigna et al., 2017). 
In what follows, Section 2 describes the theoretical model and predictions. Section 3 
outlines the experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the results, and Section 5 provides a 
discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Model and Predictions  
2.1. Theoretical Model 
In this model, we provide insight into how economic agents exert effort under different reward 
schemes for the quantity and quality of their output. We also consider how loss aversion interacts 
with the reward schemes with respect to the level of effort exerted.5 Consider an agent who exerts 
two-dimensional effort 𝑒𝑒 = (𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2), where 𝑒𝑒1 ≥ 0 is effort used to produce quantity and 𝑒𝑒2 ≥ 0 
                                                 
5 As we noted in the introduction, we focus on loss aversion, rather than the other behavioral characteristics we test, 
because we found ex post that loss aversion affects subjects’ quantity-quality tradeoff. The model is meant merely to 
guide intuition, rather than provide a strict set of predictions tested in the experiment. 
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is effort used to produce quality. The agent has one unit of effort to provide, so 𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑒𝑒2 = 1. The 
agent has ability 𝑎𝑎 > 0, and agents with higher ability produce high quality output at lower cost 
(for a given level of effort). 
The expected quantity of high-quality output produced, 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻] = 𝑒𝑒1𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2), depends on 
effort 𝑒𝑒1 used to produce quantity and effort 𝑒𝑒2 used to increase the probability of successful 
production 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2), where 𝑝𝑝′ > 0, 𝑝𝑝′′ < 0, 𝑝𝑝(0) = 0, and 𝑝𝑝(1) = 1. The expected low-quality 
output is produced with the remaining probability, i.e., 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿] = 𝑒𝑒1�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)�. The cost of 
exerting effort to produce quality is 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎), where 𝑐𝑐1 > 0, 𝑐𝑐2 < 0, 𝑐𝑐11 > 0, 𝑐𝑐12 < 0, and 
𝑐𝑐(0,𝑎𝑎) = 0. We use a simplifying assumption that the cost to produce quantity is not a function 
of ability, i.e., we normalize this cost to zero.6 The agent receives wage 𝑤𝑤1 ≥ 0 for each output 
(payment for quantity) and wage 𝑤𝑤2 ≥ 0 for each high-quality output (payment for quality). We 
assume that quality is perfectly verifiable. 
Agents are loss averse with loss aversion parameter, 𝜃𝜃. We assume that agents derive 
disutility when their payout is lower than some reference point, as in Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that the agent’s reference point is the 
payoff they receive in expectation, conditional on their ability, if they choose the levels of 𝑒𝑒1 and 
𝑒𝑒2 that maximize their payoff.7 Meanwhile, their “loss utility” is the distance between their 
expected utility and the utility derived from the expected payoff.8 We write agents’ loss function 
as: 
𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2;𝑎𝑎) = 𝜃𝜃1𝐴𝐴(𝑢𝑢(𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋∗|𝑎𝑎]) − 𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋)|𝑎𝑎]),      (1) 
                                                 
6 Including a positive cost of 𝑒𝑒1 in the agent’s utility function would change none of the comparative statics results. 
7 In a previous version of the paper, we modeled the reference point as the “sure thing” wage of 𝑤𝑤1. That is, agents 
could invest all of their effort in 𝑒𝑒1 and receive wage 𝑤𝑤1 with certainty. The main results from this model are broadly 
similar to the one proposed here. Most importantly, the amount agents spend on 𝑒𝑒2 is decreasing in 𝜃𝜃 in both models. 
8 Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) model “gain/loss” utility, where agents gain if their payoff is higher than their reference 
point. For simplicity, we focus only on “loss” utility. 
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where 𝑢𝑢′ > 0, 𝑢𝑢′′ < 0, 𝜋𝜋 is the agent’s payout (including cost 𝑐𝑐), 𝜋𝜋∗ is the agent’s maximum 
expected payout, and 1𝐴𝐴 is an indicator equaling one if 𝑢𝑢(𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋∗|𝑎𝑎]) > 𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋)|𝑎𝑎] and zero 
otherwise. 
The agent’s expected payout, 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋], can be written as: 
𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋] = 𝑤𝑤1𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿] + 𝑤𝑤2𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻] − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎) = 𝑤𝑤1𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑤𝑤2𝑒𝑒1𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎). (2) 
The expected utility of the agent is: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈] = 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋] − 𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2; 𝑎𝑎).        (3) 
Substituting 𝑒𝑒1 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒2, the agent’s maximum expected payout is achieved at the level of 
𝑒𝑒2
∗ that solves the following equation: 
𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋∗|𝑎𝑎] = −𝑤𝑤1 − 𝑤𝑤2𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2∗) + 𝑤𝑤2(1 − 𝑒𝑒2∗)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2∗) − 𝑐𝑐1(𝑒𝑒2∗,𝑎𝑎) = 0.   (4) 
Meanwhile, the agent’s expected utility from payoff 𝜋𝜋 is: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋)|𝑎𝑎] = 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)𝑢𝑢�𝑤𝑤1𝑒𝑒1 + 𝑤𝑤2𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎)� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)�𝑢𝑢�𝑤𝑤1𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎)�.  (5) 
Therefore, the agent’s first order condition is: 
−𝑤𝑤1 − 𝑤𝑤2𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2) + 𝑤𝑤2(1 − 𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2) − 𝑐𝑐1(𝑒𝑒2, 𝑎𝑎) + 𝜃𝜃1𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋)|𝑎𝑎]𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2 = 0.  (6) 
 
2.2. Predictions 
From the first order condition (6), we can derive comparative statics related to how optimal effort 
levels respond to changes in relative wages. Consider first how effort changes as the relative return 
from producing quality increases (i.e., 𝑤𝑤2 increases relative to 𝑤𝑤1). From (6), there are increasing 
differences in {𝑒𝑒2, 𝑤𝑤2} if and only if 𝑒𝑒2 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2).9 Note that this also means that there are 
                                                 
9 Formally, 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕[𝑈𝑈]
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
= [𝜃𝜃1𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢′(𝑋𝑋) + 1][(1 − 𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)] − 𝜃𝜃1𝐴𝐴�𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑤𝑤2 + 𝑐𝑐1(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎)�(1 − 𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)𝑢𝑢′′(𝑋𝑋), 
where 𝑋𝑋 = (𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑤𝑤2)(1 − 𝑒𝑒2) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒2,𝑎𝑎). 
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increasing differences in {𝑒𝑒2, 𝑤𝑤2} if and only if 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻]
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
≥ 0, since 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻]
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
= −𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2) + (1 −
𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2) and thus 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻]𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2 ≥ 0 implies 𝑒𝑒2 ≤ 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2). Intuitively, it must be true that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻]𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2 ≥ 0 
at any level of 𝑒𝑒2 chosen by the agent: otherwise, increasing 𝑒𝑒2 would decrease the expected level 
of both high-quality output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 and low-quality output 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿.10 Hence, there are increasing differences 
in {𝑒𝑒2, 𝑤𝑤2}, and 𝑒𝑒2 is increasing in 𝑤𝑤2 (and, conversely, 𝑒𝑒1 is decreasing in 𝑤𝑤2). 
Moreover, it follows that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿]
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
≤ 0, since 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿] = 𝑒𝑒1 and 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒1𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 ≤ 0, implying that 
higher quality incentives decrease the total output (the sum of high-quality and low-quality output). 
It also follows that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻]
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
≥ 0. Recall that 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻] = 𝑒𝑒1𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2) = (1 − 𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2). Therefore, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻]𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 =
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
(−𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2) + (1 − 𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2)) ≥ 0 since 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 ≥ 0 and the term in brackets is always non-
negative in equilibrium. The intuition is that an increase in 𝑤𝑤2 encourages the agent to spend more 
effort in a manner where more high-quality units are produced.  
Next, we define the error rate as the fraction of low-quality output relative to total output, 
or 𝐸𝐸 � 𝑞𝑞
𝐿𝐿
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
�. From the logic outlined above, it follows that 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[ 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
]
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
≤ 0. To show this, note that 
𝐸𝐸 �
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
� = 𝑒𝑒1�1−𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)�
𝑒𝑒1
= 1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2). Therefore, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕[ 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿]𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 = 𝜕𝜕(1−𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2))𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 = − 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2) ≤ 0 since 
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
≥ 0 and 𝑝𝑝1 > 0. These results are summarized in the following prediction: 
 
Prediction 1: The average quantity of output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 and the average error rate 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
 are weakly 
decreasing in 𝑤𝑤2, while the average level of high-quality output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 is weakly increasing in 𝑤𝑤2. 
                                                 
10 To see this, note that 𝐸𝐸[𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿] = (1 − 𝑒𝑒2)�1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2)�, which is clearly decreasing in 𝑒𝑒2. 
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Next, consider how the agent’s loss aversion parameter affects her decision to focus on 
quality effort 𝑒𝑒2. It follows directly from (6) that there are increasing differences in {𝑒𝑒2, −𝜃𝜃}, and 
hence 𝑒𝑒2 is decreasing in 𝜃𝜃. To see this, note that 
𝜕𝜕2𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈]
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 = 1𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋)|𝑎𝑎]𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2 , which is equal to 1𝐴𝐴[𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑤𝑤2𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒2) − 𝑤𝑤2(1 − 𝑒𝑒2)𝑝𝑝′(𝑒𝑒2) + 𝑐𝑐1(𝑒𝑒2, 𝑎𝑎)] at the agent’s optima. This must be less than 
zero for any 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2∗ (i.e., when 1𝐴𝐴 = 1). Hence, there are increasing differences in {𝑒𝑒2, −𝜃𝜃}. The 
intuition underlying this result is straightforward: there are diminishing returns to exerting quality 
effort in the loss aversion equation, 𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1, 𝑒𝑒2;𝑎𝑎). Hence, agents with higher loss aversion 
parameters face greater diminishing returns to exerting quality effort and thus exert less. 
Since the sign of 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
 equals the sign of −𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 and the sign of 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
 equals the sign of −𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
, 
the above comparative statics are the same with respect to 𝑤𝑤2 as they are with respect to −𝜃𝜃. 
 
Prediction 2: The average quantity of output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 and the average error rate 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
 are weakly 
increasing in 𝜃𝜃, while the average level of high-quality output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 is weakly decreasing in 𝜃𝜃. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment used participants drawn from the population of undergraduate students at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) at the BRITE laboratory. A total of 287 participants participated in 21 
experimental sessions. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to a 
computer station. The experiment proceeded in seven parts. All participants were given written 
instructions (available in Appendix A) at the beginning of each part, and an experimenter read the 
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instructions aloud. Participants were not aware of any subsequent parts until after they completed 
the preceding parts. 
In part 1, participants performed a real effort task: adding up sets of five randomly 
generated 2-digit numbers by hand, as quickly as possible, with no assistance other than a pencil 
and paper (no calculators), for 5 minutes. The 2-digit numbers task is commonly used in the 
experimental literature because it is easy to explain, does not require previous experience, and 
performance is not associated with a particular gender, socioeconomic background, or physical 
conditioning (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Cason et al., 2010). In each treatment, participants 
were provided with up to 60 problems (one at a time) they could attempt to solve during 5 minutes. 
Participants could see only one problem at a time and they could not skip any problems. Each time 
a participant arrived at a new problem, she had 5 seconds to review it before the submit button 
appeared. After spending at least 5 seconds, the computer allowed participants to enter their 
answers. The 5 second delay can be considered an opportunity cost of skipping a problem by 
submitting any random answer. 
In all treatments, as shown in Table 1, participants received 𝑤𝑤1 = $0.10 for each answer 
submitted (i.e., for quantity). Depending on the treatment, participants also received an additional 
bonus for each attempted problem answered correctly (i.e., for quality), varying from 𝑤𝑤2 = $0.00 
in the T-0.00 treatment to 𝑤𝑤2 = $3.00 in the T-3.00 treatment. While it is unlikely in a real world 
setting that one would employ the T-0.00 treatment if quality were perfectly observable, this 
treatment serves as a useful baseline against which to compare the results of the other treatments. 
In part 2, we elicited beliefs about output quality by asking participants to provide a guess 
about how many of the submitted answers they solved correctly in part 1. Participants received an 
additional $3 if their guess were equal to the number of correct answers they provided in part 1. 
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Participants were not aware of part 2 until after they finished part 1 of the experiment. The main 
purpose of eliciting participants’ beliefs about their performance was to test whether the measured 
quantity and quality of output from part 1 matched the participants’ own beliefs about how much 
quality they attempted. 
In order to learn whether behavioral motivations play a role in responsiveness to quality 
incentives, in parts 3-5, we elicited participants’ preferences toward ambiguity, risk and loss 
following a procedure similar to Shupp et al. (2013). In part 3, we elicited participants’ preferences 
toward ambiguity by presenting them with a set of 20 lotteries (see Table B1 in Appendix B). In 
each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer an ambiguous option A ($0.00 or 
$10.00 with unknown chance each) or a safe option B (increasing monotonically from $0.50 to 
$10.00). Parameters were set in such a way that more ambiguity-averse participants would choose 
safer options (and switch earlier to a safe option) than less ambiguity-averse participants. In part 
4, we elicited participants’ preferences toward risk from a set of 20 lotteries (see Table B2 in 
Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer a risky option A 
($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance each) or a safe option B (increasing monotonically from $0.50 
to $10.00). In part 5, we elicited participants’ preferences toward losses from a set of 20 lotteries 
(see Table B3 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer 
a risky option A (50% chance of losing a certain amount between -$0.50 to -$10.00) or a safe 
option B of $0.  
In part 6, we obtained a measure of participants’ abilities on the math task, independent of 
incentive concerns. In this part, participants again performed a real effort task (as in the first part 
of the experiment): adding up sets of five randomly generated 2-digit numbers by hand, as quickly 
as possible. This time, participants had only 2.5 minutes to complete the task. The computer 
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provided participants with up to 30 math problems (one at a time) that they could attempt to solve 
during the allotted time. As before, participants could see only one problem at a time and they 
could not skip any problems. Each time a participant arrived at a new problem, she had 5 seconds 
to review it before the submit button appeared. Participants received $0.50 for each problem 
answered correctly, regardless of the treatment. Contrary to the first part, participants made no 
earnings from submitted answers that were incorrect.  
Finally, in part 7, participants were asked to provide a guess about how many of the 
submitted answers they solved correctly in part 6. Participants received an additional $3 if their 
guess was equal to the number of correct answers they provided in part 6. Participants were not 
aware of this task until after they finished the preceding parts of the experiment. The main purpose 
of eliciting participants’ beliefs about their performance in part 6 was to obtain a measure of 
confidence, which may be linked to participants’ decision to put more effort into quality or 
quantity. This measure is comparable across treatments, since it is not affected by the quantity-
quality incentives that differ across treatments (unlike the guess in part 2, which may be a function 
of the different quantity-quality tradeoffs faced in part 1). 
At the end of the experiment, each participant received earnings from parts 1, 2, 6 and 7. 
For parts 3-5, in order to avoid portfolio effects, only one part and one line was paid out at random. 
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Participants’ earnings ranged from $10.50 to 
$119.70, with a median of $25.60. In addition to their earnings in the experiment, participants also 
received a $7.00 show-up fee. 
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4. Results 
4.1. How Incentives Impact Quantity and Quality 
The summary statistics of our experiment are reported in Table 2 and represented graphically in 
Figures 1-3. First, we examine how higher quality incentives (i.e., higher reward for solving 
problems correctly) impact quantity (i.e., the number of answers submitted). Prediction 1 states 
that the level of total output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 + 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿 should decrease with higher quality incentives 𝑤𝑤2.  
We begin by noting that there is a significant difference in the number of answers submitted 
between treatments T-0.00 and T-0.05 (31.42 versus 23.73; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 
0.03). In the analysis that follows, we denote the T-0.00 treatment as “zero quality incentive” and 
the T-0.05 treatment as “low quality incentive”. There are no statistically significant differences 
between treatments T-0.25 and T-0.50 where quality incentives are medium (17.00 versus 17.71; 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.65) and treatments T-1.00 and T-3.00 where quality 
incentives are high (13.35 versus 13.60; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.65). In the analysis 
that follows, we report pooled data from the “medium quality incentive” treatments T-0.25 and T-
0.50, and the “high quality incentive” treatments T-1.00 and T-3.00.11  
Figure 1 suggests that there are clear differences in the number of answers submitted 
between treatments with zero quality incentive (i.e., T-0.00), low quality incentive (i.e., T-0.05), 
medium quality incentives (i.e., T-0.25 and T-0.50) and high quality incentives (i.e., T-1.00 and 
T-3.00). Pairwise comparisons show that the differences in distributions are statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, five p-values < 0.01 and one p-value = 0.03).12 We also find significant 
                                                 
11 We find no statistically significant differences for any of the outcomes reported in this section when comparing T-
0.25 and T-0.50 or when comparing T-1.00 and T-3.00. 
12 These p-values are for comparison between pooled treatments. Similar results hold for comparisons for unpooled 
treatments. This is true of all comparisons presented in this section. Unpooled results are available upon request. 
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differences when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, 
consistent with Prediction 1, we find that higher incentives for quality decrease quantity of output.  
Second, we examine how higher quality incentives impact quality (i.e., the number of 
problems solved correctly). Recall that Prediction 1 states that the level of high-quality output 𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 
should increase with higher quality incentives 𝑤𝑤2. Figure 2 suggests that there are clear differences 
in the number of problems answered correctly between treatments for all sets of pooled treatments 
except for medium quality incentives (i.e., T-0.25 and T-0.50) versus high quality incentives (i.e., 
T-1.00 and T-3.00). Indeed, we find a significant difference in quality between each of the other 
pooled groups (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, four p-values < 0.01 and one p-value = 0.04). Meanwhile, 
there is no statistically significant difference in number of problems answered correctly between 
the medium- and high-quality incentive treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.31). We 
provide an explanation for this result in Appendix C.13 The general differences across treatments 
are also significant when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Therefore, consistent with Prediction 1, we find that higher incentives for quality increase quality 
of output. 
Third, we examine how higher quality incentives impact the error rate. To calculate the 
error rate, we use the ratio of the number of problems solved incorrectly to the number of answers 
submitted. Recall that Prediction 1 states that the error rate 𝑞𝑞
𝐿𝐿
𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻+𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
 should decrease with higher 
quality incentives 𝑤𝑤2. Figure 3 suggests that there are clear differences in the error rates between 
the four pooled treatments. Indeed, these differences are statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, five p-values < 0.01 and one p-value = 0.03). The differences are also statistically 
                                                 
13 In Appendix C, we fine-tune our measure of quality to include answers that are close to the correct answer but not 
correct (i.e., “guesstimates”). We find that higher quality incentives decrease the number of participants 
“guesstimating” the correct answer. 
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significant when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01), suggesting 
that, consistent with Prediction 1, the error rate decreases with higher quality incentives. This 
brings us to the first result: 
 
Result 1: Higher quality incentives decrease the quantity of output, increase the quality of output 
and decrease the error rate. 
 
4.2. Loss Aversion and Other Individual Characteristics 
Next, we explore whether individual characteristics impact the choice of quality versus quantity. 
To answer this question, we elicited different individual characteristics summarized in Table 3. 
The model suggests the possibility that loss aversion may play a role in the quality-quantity 
decision, so we elicited participants’ preferences regarding losses using a lottery choice 
mechanism. However, any number of behavioral characteristics, such as risk or ambiguity 
aversion, may affect the quantity-quality tradeoff. Hence, we also elicited preferences regarding 
ambiguity and risk using multiple lottery choice mechanisms (see Table B1, Table B2, and Table 
B3 in Appendix B). Parameters of the elicitation procedure were set in such a way that the more 
loss-, ambiguity-, and risk-averse participants would choose ‘safer’ options relative to ‘riskier’ 
options (and switch earlier from a risky option to a safe option) than the less ambiguity-, risk- and 
loss-averse participant. For example, a participant who in Table B2 first chooses four risky options 
A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance) and then switches to choose sixteen safe options B ($2.50-
$10.00 for sure), would be characterized as very risk averse, while a participant who first chooses 
sixteen risky options and then four safe options would be characterized as very risk seeking. 
Potentially, one could even calculate the range of risk aversion coefficients for each participant 
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that match their decisions (Holt and Laury, 2002). However, such calculations would necessarily 
have to rely on a specific utility functional form and would require a much larger sample of 
responses for each participant in order to consistently estimate such coefficients (Wilcox, 2008). 
Therefore, in the analysis that follows we use the number of safe options chosen by each participant 
in each elicitation task as an approximation of their preferences regarding ambiguity, risk, and 
losses. Although the three elicitation tasks are not directly comparable, in all three tasks, a higher 
number of safe options implies a higher level of aversion toward ambiguity, risk, and losses.14 
Moreover, in part 6 of the experiment, we elicited an independent measure of participants’ 
ability by having participants perform a real effort task for 150 seconds. In part 7, we elicited 
participants’ beliefs about their performance in part 6 (see Appendix A for details). Using these 
beliefs, we compute an individual measure of overconfidence, defined as the predicted number of 
problems solved correctly in part 6 minus the number of problems actually solved correctly. From 
Table 3, we see that the median participant is overconfident, overestimating his performance by 1 
correct problem (the mean participant overestimates performance by 0.84 correct problems). 
Next, we examine whether the elicited characteristics of participants are predictive of the 
number of answers submitted, the number of problems solved, and the error rate. We first examine 
the factors which influence the number of answers submitted. Table 4 reports the estimation results 
of different OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is quantity of output (the number of 
answers submitted), and the independent variables are dummies for the various pooled treatments, 
a measure of ability, and various behavioral measures. Specifications (2)-(7) support the non-
parametric results by showing that low, medium, and high quality incentives decrease the quantity 
                                                 
14 A correlation analysis shown in Table B4 in Appendix B indicates that there is a strong correlation between 
ambiguity-aversion and risk-aversion (ρ = 0.67), and somewhat weaker correlation between loss-aversion and 
ambiguity-aversion (ρ = 0.30) and loss-aversion and risk-aversion (ρ = 0.35). 
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of output relative to zero quality incentives, and more generally that higher quality incentives 
decrease quantity of output relative to lower quality incentives (as indicated by the p-values at the 
bottom of Table 4). Specifications (2)-(7) also indicate that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the participant’s ability and quantity of output.  
We next examine the impact of elicited individual characteristics on quantity of output, 
reported in specifications (3)-(7). Consistent with Prediction 2, we find that loss aversion is a 
significant predictor of quantity, with participants who are more loss-averse submitting more 
answers; see specification (3). Intuitively, by focusing on quantity, participants can always 
guarantee a certain amount of payment for their performance, while focusing on quality involves 
the possibility of not solving the problem correctly. Since there are diminishing returns to focusing 
on quality, a loss-averse participant might focus mainly on quantity in order to minimize potential 
losses. 
It is possible that this loss aversion result stems primarily from some treatments and not 
others. For instance, loss aversion may be less salient when incentives for quality are high, because 
the loss incurred from spending more time on a problem is smaller relative to the potential gain of 
getting the problem correct. Although this intuition does not follow directly from the model, we 
test it by including additional interaction terms; see specification (4).15 Besides confirming our 
previous findings, we also find that higher quality incentives affect loss-averse participants less. 
Moreover, we also find that loss aversion is not simply a proxy for some other behavioral 
characteristic. Specifications (5), (6), and (7) indicate that overconfidence, risk, and ambiguity are 
                                                 
15 Including interaction terms with overconfidence and ambiguity does not yield any statistically significant results, 
and we therefore do not report these results for the sake of brevity. The interaction terms with risk aversion do yield 
statistically significant results when the number of answers submitted is the dependent variable, but not in regressions 
with the other dependent variables reported in this section. These results are available upon request. 
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not predictive of quantity. We report additional robustness checks with individual treatment 
dummies in Table B5 in Appendix B. 
Next, we examine the factors which influence the choice of quality (the number of 
problems solved correctly). The estimation results reported in Table 5 provide support for the non-
parametric results that higher quality incentives increase quality of output. Furthermore, consistent 
with Prediction 2, we find that loss aversion is a significant predictor of quality, with participants 
who are less loss-averse choosing to focus on quality by solving more problems; see specifications 
(3) and (4). Again, this finding is intuitive, since there are diminishing returns to focusing on 
quality. As was the case in the quantity regressions, loss aversion only shows up as salient in the 
low quality incentive treatments; see specification (4). Intuitively, in the low quality incentive 
treatments, the benefit of focusing on quality is low relative to the loss of the sure wage associated 
with focusing on quantity. As the quality incentive increases, the latter loss becomes relatively less 
salient. We report additional robustness checks with individual treatment dummies in Table B6 in 
Appendix B. 
Finally, we examine what factors influence the error rate. The estimation results reported 
in Table 6 provides support for the non-parametric results that higher quality incentives decrease 
the error rate. Consistent with Prediction 2, there is a positive and significant relationship between 
loss aversion and the error rate in specifications (4) and (5), confirming our previous findings 
relating loss aversion to quantity and quality. We report additional robustness checks with 
individual treatment dummies in Table B7 in Appendix B. This brings us to the next result: 
 
18 
 
Result 2: Participants who are more loss-averse submit more answers, focus less on quality 
(answer fewer questions correctly), and have higher error rates, although the effect is mitigated at 
higher quality incentives. 
 
4.3. Classification of Participants 
Next, we characterize participants by response time to identify how treatment differences affected 
the incentives of participants to submit more answers or focus on quality. We begin by examining 
how much time participants spend on average on a given problem, which we consider an indicator 
of how much effort participants exert on quality. We assume that participants who spend more 
time on a problem than the average are more likely to be focusing on quality. As suggested by the 
first column in Table 7, there are significant differences in the average time spent on a problem 
when comparing pooled treatments (zero quality incentive, low quality incentive, medium quality 
incentive, and high quality incentive). Pairwise comparisons for all treatments show that the 
differences in distributions are statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, four p-values < 
0.01 and two p-values < 0.03). The difference are also significant when comparing all treatment 
jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Table 7 and Figure 4 also report the fraction of problems answered ‘quickly’ (signifying 
that a participant submits more answers) by treatment. Recall that each participant had to spend a 
minimum of 5 seconds on each problem since the ‘submit’ button did not appear on the screen 
until 5 seconds had passed. We therefore look at different cut-off points – 6, 7, and 10 seconds – 
to see whether participants answer more quickly when quality is not incentivized. We find that 
38% of answers are submitted within 6 seconds when the reward for solving problems is not 
incentivized, i.e., T-0.00, while only 1% submit answers within 6 seconds when the reward is 
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highly incentivized, i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00 (Kruskal-Wallis test across all six treatments, p-value 
< 0.01). A similar pattern is observed for participants submitting answers within 7 seconds 
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01) and within 10 seconds (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Finally, Figure 5 and the last column in Table 7 show the fraction of participants choosing 
to focus only on quality. We define a participant as focusing on quality on a question if they either 
answered the question correctly or spent at least 10 seconds to submit an answer.16 As expected, 
we find that higher quality incentives increase the number of quality types (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-
value < 0.01). 
 
Result 3: Higher quality incentives increase the number of participants focusing on quality and 
decrease the number of participants focusing on quantity. 
 
4.4. Optimal Choice of Quantity and Quality 
A participant making a decision of whether to submit more answers or focus on quality should 
take into account her ability to perform the task. As we have already shown, such ability is indeed 
important in making this decision. However, another important factor is the payment the 
participant receives for quality. For example, when the reward is 𝑤𝑤2 = $0.25, the participant earns 
$0.35 (𝑤𝑤1 = $0.10 for quantity and 𝑤𝑤2 = $0.25 for quality) for successfully completing a task, 
which comes at the cost of spending time on that task (say 𝑥𝑥 seconds depending on the ability). 
                                                 
16 We calculated numerous metrics of choosing “quality” or “quantity” (also see Table 8). For instance, another metric 
we considered was that a participant chose quality if they spent as much time submitting an answer as the minimum 
time it took them to submit an answer in part 6 (where quantity was not incentivized and payouts were the same across 
treatments). Results are similar in all specifications, and the statistics associated with other metrics are available upon 
request. Moreover, in all of the definitions we do not count decisions made in the last 30 seconds or decisions made 
in the participant’s last answer because the decision-making calculus at the end of the five minute period may be 
different than in the first four minutes. For instance, one who can correctly answer a problem in 10 seconds (meaning 
that she should focus on quality in most of the treatments) has incentive to input a quick answer if there are only 6 
seconds remaining.  
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However, the participant also has an option to focus solely on quantity, which results in a reward 
of 𝑤𝑤1 = $0.10 at the cost of a minimum 5 seconds spent on the task. Therefore, each participant 
should make a choice of whether to submit more answers or focus on quality depending on their 
relative ability to complete the task in 𝑥𝑥 seconds and prices 𝑤𝑤1 and 𝑤𝑤2. If (𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑤𝑤2)/𝑥𝑥 > 𝑤𝑤1/5 
then a participant should focus on quality, and otherwise they should simply submit more answers. 
One immediate implication is that higher 𝑤𝑤2 should lead participants to pay more attention to 
quality. 
We can calculate how many participants should have chosen to focus on quality given their 
ability. As a proxy for ability, we use the average time a participant needs to solve one problem 
correctly in part 6. Table 8 summarizes the average ability of participants across treatments: the 
first column reports the average number of seconds participants spent on each problem in part 6 in 
each treatment. Not surprisingly, since participants were randomly assigned to each treatment, 
there is no statistically significant difference in ability between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-
value = 0.46). However, since the reward for quality is different across treatments, the expected 
earnings are different. For example, when the reward is $0.25 per correct answer, a participant 
who spends 30 seconds to solve one problem correctly should expect to earn $3.50 if she chooses 
to focus on quality, i.e., ($0.25 + $0.10) × 300/30 = $3.50. However, if such a participant chooses 
to submit more answers instead, she can earn $6 since the opportunity cost is 5 seconds of moving 
to the next problem, i.e., $0.10 × 300/5 = $6.00. Therefore, a rational decision maker who can 
solve only one problem during 30 seconds should choose to submit more answers when the reward 
for quality is $0.25. Table 8 reports the fraction of participants who should choose quality over 
quantity based on their ability and quality incentives. 
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When the reward for quality is $0.00, nobody should focus on quality.17 The same is true 
when the reward is only $0.05 for all but the most mathematically gifted (none of whom took part 
in this treatment). When the reward is $0.25, 15% of participants in our experiment should choose 
to focus on quality. When the reward is $0.50 this number increases to 79%, and further to 98% 
when the reward is $1.00. Finally, when the reward is $3.00, all participants should focus on 
quality. Using this information, we can calculate the portion of participants in each treatment that 
chose to correctly submit more answers or focus on quality. We first calculate their average 
earnings from focusing on quality, as measured by the average time they spent deriving a correct 
answer in part 6 (see Table 8). Using this measure, we calculate their expected earnings from 
focusing on quality, which equals (300 / average seconds per correct answer) × ($0.10 + 𝑤𝑤2), 
where 𝑤𝑤2 differs by treatment. Any participant whose expected earnings from focusing on quality 
exceed $6 (the amount one could earn from solely focusing on quantity) should focus on quality; 
otherwise they should submit more answers. We consider it a “mistake” for a participant to focus 
on quality (even once) when she should submit more answers or for a participant to submit more 
answers when she should focus on quality. Of course, these decisions may not be a mistake if the 
participant focused on quality simply because they enjoy adding numbers. Table 8 shows that 80% 
of participants make mistakes when quality is not incentivized, 96% of participants make a mistake 
when there is a low quality incentive, while only 15-16% make mistakes when the reward is highly 
incentivized (i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00). These differences are jointly significant (Kruskal-Wallis 
test, p-value < 0.01).18 
                                                 
17 It is possible that some participants may choose to focus on quality simply because they enjoy adding numbers. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) note that “we shall not suppose that all work is unpleasant. A worker on the job may 
take pleasure in working up to some limit.” 
18 The same conclusion stands when we drop the first 34 seconds of experiment, which is one standard deviation above 
the mean time taken to answer a question in part 6 (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
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Result 4: Higher quality incentives encourage participants to make better tradeoffs between 
quantity and quality, reducing inefficient decision-making. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality 
constraint. It is not trivial to incentivize economic agents to care about both the quantity and quality 
of their output, especially when behavioral factors are at play. A large literature suggests that 
incentives designed to encourage certain behaviors may backfire (Bowles, 2009; Gneezy et al., 
2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). For example, incentives that are ‘too small’ may crowd 
out intrinsic motivation to put forth effort (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). The problem becomes 
even more complicated when behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, are considered. Yet, 
understanding the role that behavioral factors play in the quantity-quality tradeoff can inform 
managers of the most appropriate ways to structure contracts. 
We provide a theoretical model and conduct an experiment to examine how incentivizing 
quality impacts individual decisions to focus on quality versus quantity, as well as how one’s 
preferences regarding losses affect that decision. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find 
that higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality 
and decrease the error rate at the expense of lowering quantity of output. We also find that, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions, those exhibiting greater loss aversion choose to focus 
more on quantity, but only when quality incentives are weak. 
Our findings have direct relevance for managers and employers. First, we show that 
managers should take quantity-quality tradeoffs into account when designing contracts. For 
23 
 
example, a manager who is concerned with the quality of output may choose to incentivize high-
quality output. This should lead to higher quality of output and a lower error rate, but will most 
likely decrease quantity of output. Moreover, the results of our experiment show that although 
greater quality incentives are optimal to impose when the return on quality is large, the return on 
higher wages diminishes rapidly past a certain point. Therefore, the optimal compensation scheme 
should involve a balance between rewarding quantity and quality. For instance, Mauboussin 
(2012) provides the example of the Wallace Company, a pipe and valve distributor that won the 
prestigious Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award but filed for bankruptcy two years later. 
Mauboussin concludes that “both too little and too much quality can be bad for a company’s 
financial performance.” Our study provides evidence for this insight. 
Second, our findings contribute to the literature examining how behavioral components 
can be used to improve work outcomes (Haigh and List, 2005; Hossain and List, 2012). We find 
that more loss-averse participants display greater changes to their output from a change in quality 
incentives. Participants who are more loss-averse choose to focus more on quantity, increasing the 
error rates, when quality incentives are low. Therefore, a manager who is concerned with the 
quality of output may choose to avoid framing contracts in terms of losses to reduce the tendency 
of loss averse workers to focus on quantity rather than focusing on quality. 
Another practical application of our findings relates to an ongoing discussion in health 
economics on how to reward physicians in order to improve medical practice and increase social 
welfare. One part of the debate is whether to reward physicians solely for the volume of services 
they order (quantity) or to incorporate certain quality measures (quality).19 Our findings suggest 
that rewarding quality is indeed effective in increasing quality of output and decreasing the error 
                                                 
19 See the following article in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/nyregion/new-york-city-
hospitals-to-tie-doctors-performance-pay-to-quality-measures.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp  
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rate. However, in our experiment, it is easy to define and measure quality, which is not always the 
case in the medical field where quality is ill-defined and may be difficult to measure (Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2011; Godager et al., 2016).   
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Figure 1: Measure of quantity (average answers submitted) by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Measure of quality (average problems correct) by treatment 
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Figure 3: Error rate by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Fraction of problems answered in less than 10 seconds 
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Figure 5: Fraction of participants focusing only on quality 
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Table 1: Summary of treatments 
 
Treatment 
Payment for each problem 
N Submitted Correct 
T-0.00 $0.10 $0.00 45 
T-0.05 $0.10 $0.05 48 
T-0.25 $0.10 $0.25 46 
T-0.50 $0.10 $0.50 51 
T-1.00 $0.10 $1.00 52 
T-3.00 $0.10 $3.00 45 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Reward 
Average 
submitted 
Average 
correct 
Average 
incorrect 
Error rate = 
incorrect/submitted N 
$0.00 31.42 5.47 25.96 0.70 45 
 (2.47) (0.94) (3.10) (0.05)  
$0.05 23.73 7.50 16.23 0.54 48 
 (1.83) (0.79) (2.42) (0.05)  
$0.25 17.00 10.54 6.46 0.31 46 
 (1.09) (0.65) (1.36) (0.04)  
$0.50 17.71 10.71 7.00 0.33 51 
 (1.04) (0.73) (1.28) (0.04)  
$1.00 13.35 10.92 2.42 0.18 52 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.45) (0.02)  
$3.00 13.60 11.58 2.02 0.16 45 
 (0.69) (0.74) (0.34) (0.03)  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Elicited characteristics  
 
Percentile Loss Ambiguity Risk 
Ability 
(correct in part 6) 
Overconfidence 
(guess – correct) 
Min 0 0 0 0 -3 
25% 14 10 10 5 0 
50% 15 11 11 6 1 
75% 17 13 12 7 1 
Max 20 20 20 17 5 
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Table 4: OLS regressions of quantity (number of answers submitted) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = Quantity (number submitted) 
Ability 0.43 0.59*** 0.56** 0.47** 0.67*** 0.58** 0.59*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
Low quality incentives  -7.42*** -7.80*** 13.73 -7.40*** -7.46*** -7.44*** 
  (T-0.05)  (1.99) (1.98) (9.47) (1.99) (2.00) (2.00) 
Medium quality incentives  -14.40*** -14.92*** 17.27* -14.39*** -14.39*** -14.42*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (1.74) (1.73) (8.90) (1.74) (1.74) (1.74) 
High quality incentives  -18.04*** -18.18*** 16.65** -17.96*** -17.96*** -18.02*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (1.73) (1.72) (7.92) (1.73) (1.74) (1.74) 
Loss aversion   0.45** 2.32***    
   (0.18) (0.47)    
Loss aversion ×    -1.53**    
  Low quality incentives    (0.64)    
Loss aversion ×    -2.23***    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.59)    
Loss aversion ×    -2.43***    
  High quality incentives    (0.54)    
Overconfidence     0.53   
     (0.49)   
Risk aversion      0.13  
      (0.20)  
Ambiguity aversion       0.06 
       (0.19) 
Constant 16.74*** 27.92*** 21.73*** -4.42 26.99*** 26.54*** 27.26*** 
 (1.76) (1.96) (3.21) (6.78) (2.14) (2.91) (2.89) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.31 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.01 0.02 -- 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 5: OLS regressions of quality (number correct) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 1.43*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.41*** 1.48*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Low quality incentives  2.66*** 2.79*** -2.51 2.68*** 2.67*** 2.67*** 
  (T-0.05)  (0.76) (0.76) (3.70) (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) 
Medium quality incentives  4.35*** 4.53*** -4.26 4.36*** 4.35*** 4.36*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.66) (0.66) (3.48) (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) 
High quality incentives  5.56*** 5.61*** -1.33 5.66*** 5.54*** 5.55*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.66) (0.65) (3.10) (0.65) (0.66) (0.66) 
Loss aversion   -0.15** -0.58***    
   (0.07) (0.18)    
Loss aversion ×    0.37    
  Low quality incentives    (0.25)    
Loss aversion ×    0.60**    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.23)    
Loss aversion ×    0.49**    
  High quality incentives    (0.21)    
Overconfidence     0.60***   
     (0.18)   
Risk aversion      -0.03  
      (0.08)  
Ambiguity aversion       -0.04 
       (0.07) 
Constant 0.81 -2.71*** -0.59 5.35** -3.77*** -2.38** -2.24** 
 (0.63) (0.75) (1.22) (2.65) (0.80) (1.11) (1.10) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.01 0.01 -- 0.01 0.01 0.01 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.02 0.04 -- 0.01 0.02 0.03 
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Table 6: OLS regressions of the error rate (incorrect/submitted) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/submitted) 
Ability -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Low quality incentives  -0.17*** -0.18*** 0.09 -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
  (T-0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Medium quality incentives  -0.35*** -0.36*** 0.20 -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.24) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
High quality incentives  -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.04 -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.52*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.22) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Loss aversion   0.01** 0.04***    
   (0.00) (0.01)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.02    
  Low quality incentives    (0.02)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.04**    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.02)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.03**    
  High quality incentives    (0.01)    
Overconfidence     0.01   
     (0.01)   
Risk aversion      0.01  
      (0.01)  
Ambiguity aversion       0.00 
       (0.00) 
Constant 0.62*** 0.92*** 0.78*** 0.39** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.18) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.10 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.41 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
 
Table 7: Classification of participants by response time 
 
Reward 
Average time 
per problem 
Fraction guessed 
< 6 seconds 
Fraction guessed 
< 7 seconds 
Fraction guessed 
< 10 seconds 
Fraction only 
choosing quality 
$0.00 13.43 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.24 
 (1.38) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
$0.05 16.26 0.24 0.33 0.40 0.38 
 (1.19) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
$0.25 19.54 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.59 
 (1.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
$0.50 18.85 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.55 
 (0.88) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
$1.00 23.61 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.87 
 (0.88) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) 
$3.00 23.11 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.84 
 (0.88) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 8: Ability and expected earnings from quality 
 
Reward 
Average seconds 
per correct 
answer (part 6) 
Expected 
earnings 
from quality 
Fraction should 
 focus on 
quality Mistake 
$0.00 30.47 1.28 0.00 0.80 
 (3.76) (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) 
$0.05 33.69 1.73 0.00 0.96 
 (3.80) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) 
$0.25 23.91 4.84 0.15 0.93 
 (1.13) (0.23) (0.05) (0.04) 
$0.50 28.90 8.11 0.76 0.61 
 (3.07) (0.50) (0.06) (0.07) 
$1.00 28.10 13.75 0.98 0.15 
 (2.22) (0.65) (0.02) (0.05) 
$3.00 27.49 40.50 1.00 0.16 
 (2.46) (2.49) (0.00) (0.05) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication): Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds 
for this research. The instructions are simple.  
The experiment will proceed in 7 parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of choices that determine your total earnings. The currency used in all parts of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. 
You have already received a $7.00 participation fee. Your earnings from 7 parts of the experiment will be added to 
your participation fee. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim 
out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
PART 1 
In this part of the experiment, you will work on your own and have the chance to earn money by solving 2-
digit math problems. At the end of the whole experiment, your entire earnings will be paid out to you immediately 
and in cash. 
You will have 5 minutes (300 seconds) for this part. The computer will provide you with up to 60 math 
problems (one at a time) that you can attempt to solve during this 5 minutes. Each problem will consist of adding 5, 
two-digit numbers. All of the problems are about the same level of difficulty. You will see the problems one at a time 
and you will not be able to skip any problems. You will not be able to go back to any problems. 
Your earnings for each problem depend on your responses in the following way: 
• For each problem you attempt, you will receive $0.10.  
• For each attempted problem you answer correctly, you will receive a bonus of $0.50.  
• For each attempted problem you answer incorrectly, you will receive a penalty of -$0.00.  
Answering a problem correctly means that you have provided the correct answer, for example, 2+2=4 is 
correct while 2+2=3 is incorrect. 
The time remaining will be displayed on the overhead. When 5 minutes are up, time will be called. You will 
not be able to respond to any more problems after time is up because your computer will be on pause. After time is 
called, you will need to enter “0” to move on to the outcome screen, and the last problem you answer will not count 
as an attempt. An example of a problem screen is shown below. 
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Note that you will know which problem you are on. The 5 numbers that you should add are listed in the 
middle of the screen. In this example, you should be adding 28+39+48+23+25. 
Each time you arrive at a new problem, you will have 5 seconds to review it before the submit button appears. 
After spending at least 5 seconds, the computer will allow you enter your answer. Although you will be required to 
spend at least 5 seconds on each problem, you can also spend more than 5 seconds. 
Press “Submit” when you are ready to go on to the next problem. 
You will not know if you answered any one problem correctly or incorrectly until the end of the experiment, 
when you will learn your total number of correct and incorrect responses. 
The actual earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will 
be independent of other parts of the experiment. 
 
PART 2 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to provide a guess about how many of the attempted problems 
in Part 1 you solved correctly. You will receive an additional $3 if your guess is equal to the number of correct 
answers that you provided us in Part 1.  
Please enter your guess on your screen. Record your answer (and outcome) below. The actual earnings for 
this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be independent of other parts of 
the experiment. 
 
Use the following table for records: 
 Record your Results Here 
Number of Problems Attempted  
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
PARTS 3-5 
In PARTS 3-5 of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
In each PART, you will see a table with 20 lines. You will state whether you prefer Option A or Option B in 
each line. You should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line in PARTS 
4-6 will be the ‘line that counts’ and will be paid out.  
• At the end of the experiment, we will draw a card from a deck of cards numbered 3, 4, 5. Depending on 
which card is chosen, either PART 3, PART 4, or PART 5 will “count” 
• Then, we will draw a card from a deck of cards numbered 1, 2, ….20. The number on the card chosen 
indicates which line in that part will be paid out 
Because each line is equally likely to be selected, and because you do not know which line will be selected 
when you make your choices, you should pay close attention to the choices you make in each line. In some lines, 
depending on the decisions you make, you may earn up to $10. 
 
PART 3 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
of 20 lines in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive an amount of money specified by option B – between $0.50 and $10, depending on the line. If you chose 
option A in that line, you will receive either $10 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we 
will randomly draw a ball from a bag containing twenty balls. The balls are either white or orange, but you do not 
know the exact number of white and orange balls before you make your decision. Before you draw the ball you choose 
a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, you will receive $10. If the 
drawn ball is orange, you will receive $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
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Decision 
Number Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$3.00 for sure  
7 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$5.50 for sure  
12 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$7.50 for sure  
16 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$8.00 for sure  
17 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$8.50 for sure  
18 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$9.00 for sure  
19 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$9.50 for sure  
20 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
 
$10.00 for sure  
 
PART 4 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
of 20 lines in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive an amount of money specified by option B – between $0.50 and $10, depending on the line. If you chose 
option A in that line, you will receive either $10 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we 
will randomly draw a ball from a bag containing twenty balls. There are ten orange and ten white balls in the bag. 
That means that when we draw a ball, there is a 50% chance that it is white and a 50% chance that it is orange. Before 
you draw the ball you choose a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, 
you will receive $10. If the drawn ball is orange, you will receive $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
   
Decision 
Number Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$3.00 for sure  
7 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$5.50 for sure  
12 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$7.50 for sure  
16 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$8.00 for sure  
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17 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$8.50 for sure  
18 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$9.00 for sure  
19 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$9.50 for sure  
20 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
 
$10.00 for sure  
 
PART 5 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 20 lines 
in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive $0. If you chose option A in that line, you can receive either a loss between -$1 and -$20, depending on 
the line, or a gain of $10. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we will randomly draw a ball 
from a bag containing twenty balls. There are ten orange and ten white balls in the bag. Before you draw the ball you 
choose a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, you will receive -$x (the 
exact amount depends on the line chosen). If the drawn ball is orange, you will receive $10. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
 
Decision 
Number Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 -$1.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance 
 
$0.00 for sure  
2 -$2.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
3 -$3.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
4 -$4.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
5 -$5.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
 6 -$6.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
7 -$7.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
8 -$8.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
9 -$9.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
10 -$10.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
 11 -$11.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
12 -$12.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
13 -$13.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
14 -$14.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
15 -$15.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
16 -$16.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
17 -$17.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
18 -$18.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
19 -$19.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
20 -$20.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
 
PART 6 
In this part of the experiment, you will work on your own and have the chance to earn money by solving 2-
digit math problems.  
You will have 2 and a half minutes (150 seconds) for this part. The computer will provide you with up to 30 
math problems (one at a time) that you can attempt to solve during this 2 and a half minutes. Each problem will consist 
of adding 5, two-digit numbers. All of the problems are about the same level of difficulty. You will see the problems 
one at a time and you will not be able to skip any problems. You will not be able to go back to any problems. 
Your earnings for each problem depend on your responses in the following way: 
• For each problem you answer correctly, you will receive $0.50.  
• There is no penalty for incorrect problems, and no earnings from attempted problems that are not correct 
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Answering a problem correctly means that you have provided the correct answer, for example, 2+2=4 is 
correct while 2+2=3 is incorrect. 
The time remaining will be displayed on the overhead. When 2 and a half minutes are up, time will be called. 
You will not be able to respond to any more problems after time is up because your computer will be on pause. After 
time is called, you will need to enter “0” to move on to the outcome screen, and the last problem you answer will not 
count as an attempt. 
The actual earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will 
be independent of other parts of the experiment. 
 
PART 7 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to provide a guess about how many of the attempted problems 
in Part 6 you solved correctly. You will receive an additional $3 if your guess is equal to the number of correct 
answers that you provided us in Part 6.  
Please enter your guess on your screen. Record your answer (and outcome) below. The actual earnings for 
this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be independent of other parts of 
the experiment. 
 
Use the following table for records: 
 Record your Results Here 
Number of Problems Attempted  
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Earnings Sheet 
  Result Your Earnings 
PART 1 – Adding Numbers 
Number of Problems Attempted  
 Number of Problems Correct  
Number of Problems Incorrect  
PART 2 – Guessing Game Guess About the Number of Problems Correct   
Actual Number of Problems Correct  
PARTS 3 - 5 Line Games 
Which Part is Chosen?   ☐ PART 3   ☐ PART 4    ☐ PART 5 
Line that Counts (1-20)  
 Color Chosen (White or Orange)  
PART 6 – Adding Numbers 
Number of Problems Attempted  
 Number of Problems Correct  
Number of Problems Incorrect  
PART 7 - Guessing Game 
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 Actual Number of Problems Correct  
TOTAL: $ 
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Appendix B (For Online Publication): Additional Tables 
 
Table B1: Elicitation of ambiguity aversion preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice ambiguous option safe option 
# 1 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $0.50 for sure 
# 2 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $1.00 for sure 
# 3 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $1.50 for sure 
# 4 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $2.00 for sure 
# 5 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $2.50 for sure 
# 6 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $3.00 for sure 
# 7 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $3.50 for sure 
# 8 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $4.00 for sure 
# 9 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $4.50 for sure 
# 10 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $5.00 for sure 
# 11 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $5.50 for sure 
# 12 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $6.00 for sure 
# 13 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $6.50 for sure 
# 14 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $7.00 for sure 
# 15 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $7.50 for sure 
# 16 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $8.00 for sure 
# 17 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $8.50 for sure 
# 18 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $9.00 for sure 
# 19 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $9.50 for sure 
# 20 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $10.00 for sure 
Participants choose between an ambiguous option A ($0.00 or $10.00 
with unknown chance) or a safe option B (a certain amount for sure). 
 
 
 
Table B2: Elicitation of risk preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice ambiguous option safe option 
# 1 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.50 for sure 
# 2 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $1.00 for sure 
# 3 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $1.50 for sure 
# 4 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $2.00 for sure 
# 5 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $2.50 for sure 
# 6 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $3.00 for sure 
# 7 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $3.50 for sure 
# 8 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $4.00 for sure 
# 9 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $4.50 for sure 
# 10 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $5.00 for sure 
# 11 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $5.50 for sure 
# 12 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $6.00 for sure 
# 13 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $6.50 for sure 
# 14 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $7.00 for sure 
# 15 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $7.50 for sure 
# 16 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $8.00 for sure 
# 17 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $8.50 for sure 
# 18 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $9.00 for sure 
# 19 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $9.50 for sure 
# 20 $0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $10.00 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% 
chance) or a safe option B (a certain amount for sure). 
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Table B3: Elicitation of loss aversion preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice risky option safe option 
# 1 -$0.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 2 -$1.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 3 -$1.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 4 -$2.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 5 -$2.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 6 -$3.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 7 -$3.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 8 -$4.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 9 -$4.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 10 -$5.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 11 -$5.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 12 -$6.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 13 -$6.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 14 -$7.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 15 -$7.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 16 -$8.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 17 -$8.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 18 -$9.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 19 -$9.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 20 -$10.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky option A (which has 50% chance 
of losing certain amount) or a safe option B ($0.00 for sure). 
 
 
 
Table B4: Correlation between ambiguity, risk and loss-aversion  
 
   Correlations 
Variable Observations Average Ambiguity aversion Risk aversion Loss aversion 
Ambiguity aversion 287 11.61 1   
     [# safe choices]  (3.05)    
Risk aversion 287 10.91 0.60*** 1  
     [# safe choices]  (2.81)    
Loss aversion 287 14.89 0.28*** 0.32*** 1 
     [# safe choices]  (3.09)    
*** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B5: OLS regressions of quantity, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable = Quantity (number submitted) 
Ability 0.43 0.60*** 0.57** 0.45** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Treatment T-$0.05  -7.42*** -7.80*** 13.83 
  (2.00) (1.99) (9.53) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -14.81*** -15.40*** 20.70** 
  (2.02) (2.02) (10.47) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -14.03*** -14.50*** 12.66 
  (1.97) (1.97) (11.02) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -18.14*** -18.01*** 17.12* 
  (1.96) (1.94) (8.89) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -17.93*** -18.39*** 16.69* 
  (2.03) (2.02) (9.14) 
Loss aversion   0.45** 2.33*** 
   (0.19) (0.47) 
Loss aversion x    -1.54** 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.64) 
Loss aversion x    -2.47*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.69) 
Loss aversion x    -1.90*** 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.73) 
Loss aversion x    -2.48*** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.62) 
Loss aversion x    -2.42*** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.61) 
Constant 16.74*** 27.91*** 21.63*** -4.38 
 (1.76) (1.97) (3.23) (6.82) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.38 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B6: OLS regressions of quality, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 1.43*** 1.39*** 1.40*** 1.43*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Treatment T-$0.05  2.66*** 2.79*** -2.58 
  (0.76) (0.76) (3.71) 
Treatment T-$0.25  4.17*** 4.38*** -6.57 
  (0.77) (0.77) (4.08) 
Treatment T-$0.50  4.51*** 4.68*** -1.64 
  (0.75) (0.75) (4.29) 
Treatment T-$1.00  5.30*** 5.26*** -0.72 
  (0.75) (0.74) (3.47) 
Treatment T-$3.00  5.86*** 6.03*** -1.48 
  (0.77) (0.77) (3.56) 
Loss aversion   -0.16** -0.58*** 
   (0.07) (0.18) 
Loss aversion x    0.38 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.25) 
Loss aversion x    0.74*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.27) 
Loss aversion x    0.44 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.28) 
Loss aversion x    0.42* 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.24) 
Loss aversion x    0.52** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.24) 
Constant 0.81 -2.71*** -0.47 5.32** 
 (0.63) (0.75) (1.23) (2.66) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.44 0.56 0.57 0.58 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B7: OLS regressions of the error rate, with individual treatment dummies  
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/submitted) 
Ability -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treatment T-$0.05  -0.17*** -0.18*** 0.10 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -0.36*** -0.38*** 0.30 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.29) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -0.34*** -0.35*** 0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.30) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.02 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.24) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) 
Loss aversion   0.01** 0.04*** 
   (0.00) (0.01) 
Loss aversion x    -0.02 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.05** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.03 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.03** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.03** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.02) 
Constant 0.62*** 0.92*** 0.77*** 0.39** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.19) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.10 0.41 0.42 0.44 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix C (For Online Publication): Fine-Tuning the Quality Metric 
In this appendix, we address a puzzle laid out in Section 4.1: although participants in the medium 
quality incentive treatments had higher error rates than those in the high quality incentive 
treatments, they correctly answered a similar number of questions. We also reported in Section 4.1 
that participants in the medium quality incentive treatments had higher quantity (i.e., answers 
submitted) than those in the high quality incentive treatments. Combining these insights suggests 
that participants in the medium quality incentive treatments answered quicker – leading to a higher 
error rate – but not so quickly that they never answered correctly. In other words, these results 
indicate the possibility that participants in the medium quality treatments made quick, educated 
guesses at the correct answer. 
To test this possibility, we fine-tune our measure of quality by considering “guesstimates”: 
answers that are within 20 of the correct answer but not correct. Results are qualitatively similar 
at cutoff points within 5 and 10 of the correct answer. Such answers suggest some effort – they are 
not merely the result of participants flying through the questions to pocket the $0.10 per answer 
submitted. Figure C1 reports the mean by treatment. Not surprisingly, “guesstimating” is 
decreasing in the quality incentive, and the differences between treatments are statistically 
significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). The logic behind this result is clear: since 
participants are only incentivized to get the problem exactly correct (and not simply close to 
correct), the benefit to spending more time on a problem is increasing in the amount paid for 
quality. This finding is also consistent with the results reported in Section 4.3, where we found 
that higher quality incentives led participants to spend more time on problems. 
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Figure C1: “Guesstimates” (answer within 20 of correct but not correct) by treatment 
 
 
 
These non-parametric results are confirmed in Table C1, which reports OLS estimates 
where the dependent variable is our metric of guesstimates. Again, the number of guesstimates is 
decreasing in the quality incentive. Perhaps unsurprisingly, overconfidence is positively correlated 
with guesstimates; see specification (5). Those who are overconfident in their ability may suspect 
they can answer more correctly and with greater speed than they actually can. We conclude that 
higher quality incentives decrease the number of participants “guesstimating” the correct answer. 
Our results therefore suggest an answer to the puzzle noted at the beginning of the section. 
Participants in medium quality treatment treatments “guesstimated” about one more problem on 
average than those in high quality incentive treatments. In the context of our experiment, this 
suggests that if enough of these guesstimates were correct that the higher number of answers 
submitted offsets the higher error rate in the medium quality incentive treatments. More broadly, 
these results suggest that high quality output can be achieved with modest quality incentives, so 
long as it does not matter to the principal that the agents occasionally err. 
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Table C1: OLS regressions of “guesstimates” 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable = “Guesstimate” (incorrect but within 20 of correct answer) 
Ability 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.03 
  (correct in part 6) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Low quality incentives  -1.69** -1.72** 5.04 -1.68** -1.68** -1.68** 
  (T-0.05)  (0.78) (0.78) (3.83) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) 
Medium quality incentives  -2.81*** -2.84*** 5.74 -2.80*** -2.81*** -2.80*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.68) (0.68) (3.60) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68) 
High quality incentives  -3.93*** -3.94*** 1.84 -3.87*** -3.94*** -3.93*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.67) (0.68) (3.20) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68) 
Loss aversion   0.03 0.43**    
   (0.07) (0.19)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.47*    
  Low quality incentives    (0.26)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.59**    
  Medium quality incentives    (0.24)    
Loss aversion ×    -0.41*    
  High quality incentives    (0.22)    
Overconfidence     0.34*   
     (0.19)   
Risk aversion      -0.02  
      (0.08)  
Ambiguity aversion       -0.02 
       (0.07) 
Constant 2.68*** 5.06*** 4.63*** -1.00 4.46*** 5.28*** 5.33*** 
 (0.61) (0.76) (1.26) (2.74) (0.83) (1.13) (1.13) 
Observations 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 
p-value, Low = Medium -- 0.09 0.09 -- 0.09 0.09 0.10 
p-value, Low = High -- 0.00 0.00 -- 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.04 0.04 -- 0.05 0.04 0.04 
 
 
